Ibuka retired in 1976[11] and Morita was named chairman of the company.[10] In 1979, the Walkman was introduced, making it one of the world's first portable music players and in 1982, Sony launched the world's first Compact Disc player, the Sony CDP-101, with a Compact Disc (CD) itself, a new data storage format Sony and Philips co-developed.[12] In that year, a 3.5-inch floppy disk structure was introduced by Sony and it soon became the defacto standard. In 1984, Sony launched the Discman series which extended their Walkman brand to portable CD products.
This is the first book that takes a multidisciplinary look at both the causes and the consequences of Portuguese decolonisation &endash; and is the only one that places the loss of Portugal's Eastern Empire in the context of the loss of its African Empire. Furthermore, it is the only English language book that relates the process of Portuguese decolonisation with the search for a new Portuguese vision of its place in the world.
Lee Kuan Yew From Third World To First World Ebook 75
By the end of World War II, strategists in Washington and London looked ahead to a new era in which the United States shouldered global responsibilities and Britain concentrated its regional interests more narrowly. The two powers also viewed the Muslim world through very different lenses. Mapping the End of Empire reveals how Anglo-American perceptions of geography shaped postcolonial futures from the Middle East to South Asia.Aiyaz Husain shows that American and British postwar strategy drew on popular notions of geography as well as academic and military knowledge. Once codified in maps and memoranda, these perspectives became foundations of foreign policy. In South Asia, American officials envisioned an independent Pakistan blocking Soviet influence, an objective that outweighed other considerations in the contested Kashmir region. Shoring up Pakistan meshed perfectly with British hopes for a quiescent Indian subcontinent once partition became inevitable. But serious differences with Britain arose over America's support for the new state of Israel. Viewing the Mediterranean as a European lake of sorts, U.S. officials--even in parts of the State Department--linked Palestine with Europe, deeming it a perfectly logical destination for Jewish refugees. But British strategists feared that the installation of a Jewish state in Palestine could incite Muslim ire from one corner of the Islamic world to the other.As Husain makes clear, these perspectives also influenced the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and blueprints for the UN Security Council and shaped French and Dutch colonial fortunes in the Levant and the East Indies.
The process of globalization had already begun in the late nineteenth century. Before World War I, trade and foreign investment were fairly globalized. Because of low political obstacles to international migration, labor markets actually were more globalized at the beginning of the twentieth century than at its end. The two world wars and the Great Depression between them interrupted the process of global market integration for about half a century. Thereafter, the process regained force and speed. Now, inexpensive, fast, and reliable communication and transportation enable producers of goods and some service providers in low-wage countries to challenge high-cost producers in rich countries on their home turf, but technological innovation resulting in falling prices and rising speed of intercontinental communication and transportation is not the only determinant of globalization. Political decisions in rich and poor countries alike contribute strongly to globalization, too. Tariffs and, to a lesser degree, nontariff barriers to trade have been reduced. Many countries try to find and exploit their comparative advantage, to realize economies of scale and gains from trade by looking for buyers and sellers everywhere. If trade between countries is truly free, then it promises to enrich all nations.
Since the publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1976), we have known that the size of the market limits the division of labor and that the division of labor boosts innovation and productivity. In principle, globalization is the logical endpoint of the economic evolution that began when families switched from subsistence farming and household production to production for the market. As long as globalization is not yet completed-and it certainly is not yet-gains from trade remain to be realized by further market expansion. Because globalization adds to competitive pressure, however, it causes resentment, and because globalization springs from technological innovation and political decisions that promote free trade, these innovations and decisions attract resentment, too. The world is already globalized enough that national resistance does limited damage. Except for the United States, national resistance is more likely to contribute to a country’s decline than to derail the process of globalization.
Another issue also must be considered. Barbieri’s (2002) measures are based on dyadic trade shares relative to national trade, whereas Russett and Oneal’s measures are based on dyadic trade shares relative to the size of national economies. Gartzke and Li (2003) have demonstrated—arithmetically as well as empirically—that trade shares relative to national trade may rise when nations are disconnected from world trade. Nations may concentrate most of their trade on a few partners and remain rather closed economies. If Barbieri’s and Oneal and Russett’s measures of bilateral trade and their effects are simultaneously considered, then Barbieri’s trade shares exert a conflictenhancing effect and Oneal and Russett’s trade dependence exerts a conflict-reducing effect. This finding of Gartzke and Li’s study not only replicates the substantive findings of both main contenders in the debate about trade and conflict, but it remains robust whether one relies on the Oneal and Russett data or on the Barbieri data, whether one includes all dyads or only dyads for which there is some risk of military conflict to begin with. If one is interested in finding out whether more trade is better or worse for the avoidance of military conflict, then it seems more meaningful to focus on a measure that is related to openness at the national level of analysis, as Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999, 2003a, 2003b; Russett and Oneal 2001) have done, than on a measure that may be high for fairly closed economies, as Barbieri (2002) has done.
Peace by trade is at least as important as peace by democracy. Trade (because of its contribution to prosperity) underwrites democracy and thereby the democratic peace where it prevails. Moreover, it does not suffer from a geopolitical complication that affects peace by democratization. According to the best research, the risk of war between democracies is much lower than elsewhere, but the risk of war between a democracy and an autocracy is higher than elsewhere, at least in recent decades. Although Russett and Oneal (2001, 116) no longer accept this view, I am not convinced that they are correct. To me, findings from a separate analysis of disputes in the Cold War period (Oneal and Russett 1997) look more persuasive than an analysis of data beginning in 1885 that combines relationships from the multipolar pre-World War II period, the bipolar Cold War period, and the beginning of the unipolar period thereafter. Some of the findings reported by Russett and Oneal (2001, 113)—namely, the qualitatively different alliance effects on militarized disputes found in the multipolar and bipolar periods of observation—cast doubt on the wisdom of imposing the same causal structure on different periods of world politics (Gowa 1999).
Second, we have few reasons for optimism about the applicability of the capitalist-peace strategy to the Muslim world. Certainly, it does not look like a solution to the problem of international terrorism, although it might help in achieving something like containment of the problem—that is, in denying non-Muslim allies to Muslim terrorists and their sympathizers. My pessimism about the Muslim world derives from two sources. Muslim civilization so far has resisted democratization more consistently and persistently than other non-Western civilizations. Turkey is still the best example of a Muslim democracy, but Turkish democracy is strongly guided by the secularist armed forces, which makes the democratic character of the regime dubious. Moreover, even though Atatürk began the process of secularization in the 1920s, its success is still in doubt at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 2ff7e9595c
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